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DEJAMES v. MAGNIFICENCE CARRIERS, INC.*:
EXAMINING THE LIMITATIONS ON
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN
FEDERAL COURT
Our judicial forums are constitutionally limited in exercising personal jurisdiction 1 over a foreign defendant 2 by the restrictions of the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments.3 In DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers,Inc.,4 the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was given an opportunity
to analyze the parameters of personal jurisdiction within "our
654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981).
1. Jurisdiction, the power to decide a case or controversy between two
parties, is comprised of both jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction over the person. Jurisdiction over the person relates to the power to
decide a case between the parties before a court. Since a plaintiff submits
himself to the power of a court by filing suit, the obstacle to jurisdiction is
obtaining the power to bind the defendant. D. KARLEN, CvIL LrriGAION 4-7
(1978). For convenience, the term "jurisdiction" as used in this article refers only to jurisdiction over the person (personal jurisdiction).
A court must have jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the
person. It must also be competent to adjudicate the matter, i.e. it must have
proper venue, and there must be valid service of process in order to provide
sufficient notice of the suit to the defendant. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See generally Barrett, Venue and
Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestionsfor Reform, 7 VAND.
L. REV. 608 (1954).
2. Ordinarily, a foreign corporation is one which is not incorporated
under the laws of the forum which is attempting to exercise jurisdiction.
For the purposes of this article, however, the term "foreign corporation" will
be synonymous with the term "alien corporation," meaning not incorporated under the laws of the United States.
Foreign corporations are considered "persons" under the due process
clauses of both the fourteenth and fifth amendments. Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522 (1954) ("aliens cannot be deprived... of life, liberty or property
without due process of law").
3. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. These amendments provide that no
person may be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. More commonly, these portions of the amendments are known as the
"due process" clauses.
The due process clause of the fifth amendment limits the federal government's exercise of its sovereign power. See, e.g., Mariash v. Morrill, 496
F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974). See also infra note 62. See generally Green, Federal
JurisdictionIn Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 VAND. L.
REV. 967 (1961). In contrast, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment limits the various states in their exercise of sovereign power.
See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain Pont a Moussan, 636 F.2d
1300, 1318-19 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See generally Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An
End to Ambivalence in JurisdictionalTheory?, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 61 (1977);
Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the In Personam
*
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Federalism ' 5 by deciding how a foreign defendant may become
constitutionally amenable to suit in a federal court. 6 The court
first considered whether the foreign defendant could be amenable to suit based on its contact with the state in which the district court sits. 7 Alternatively, the court considered whether the

foreign defendant's contacts with the United States could be aggregated to form a basis for personal jurisdiction. 8 In deciding
these issues, the DeJames court chose to employ restrictive,
traditional methods of jurisdictional analysis. 9
Jurisdictionof State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 569 (1958); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 33 (1978).
These amendments have been interpreted to protect individuals
against arbitrary governmental interference. Thus, the guarantee afforded
by due process is the right to fair procedure whenever life, liberty or property is at stake. Although the courts have struggled to define the requirements of due process, they have been only moderately successful. The
latest pronouncement by the Supreme Court regarding 14th amendment
due process analysis allows personal jurisdiction to be exercised when a
defendant has such purposeful minimum contacts with the forum that it is
fair to compel him to defend and that the exercise of jurisdiction will not
impinge on the sovereignty of the sister states. World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 280, 291 (1980). See generally E. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 12.1, 12.2 (2d ed. 1977); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
CIVIL §§ 1064-1073 (1969 &Supp. 1979).
4. 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981).
5. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (Black, J., writing for the

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:

majority, acknowledged the unique balance of judicial power within "our
Federalism").
6. The DeJames court examined two ways in which a foreign defendant may be called to appear in federal court: first, through contacts with the
state in which the district court sits, recognizing the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment as a limitation upon the exercise of jurisdiction;
second, through contacts aggregated throughout the United States (national contacts), recognizing that the due process clause of the fifth amendment normally limits the exercise of jurisdiction. 654 F.2d 280, 283 (3d Cir.
1981).
7. Id. at 283-84. See infra notes 24-42 and accompanying text.
8. Id. at 286. See infra notes 44-82 and accompanying text.
9. Less restrictive and more commercially realistic approaches to jurisdiction have developed to meet the inadequacies of traditional jurisdictional analysis. The progressive methods discussed in this article, the
"national contacts" and "stream of commerce" theories, were expressly discussed in DeJames. See infra notes 14 & 27-33 and accompanying text.
The traditional notions of jurisdictional analysis are derived from the
landmark cases of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) and International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 280 (1980), the Supreme Court enmeshed the Pennoyer
power theory of jurisdiction, which requires a defendant to be physically
present within a forum, with the InternationalShoe theory which requires
that the defendant be afforded fundamental fairness by analyzing the quality and nature of a defendant's contacts or ties with the forum to determine
if jurisdiction exists. See generally Redish, Due Process, Federalism,and
Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112
(1981); Comment, Federalism,Due Process,and Minimum Contacts: WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 80 CoLum. L. REV. 1341 (1980).
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The foreign defendant, Hitachi Shipbuilding and Engineering (Hitachi), refurbished a vessel in Japan under contract with
the other Japanese defendants. 10 The plaintiff, Joseph
DeJames, was seriously injured while working aboard the refurbished vessel while it was moored in a New Jersey harbor. As a
result of his injuries, DeJames brought an admiralty" action in
New Jersey federal court. DeJames alleged that his injury was
caused by Hitachi's defective refurbishing of the vessel. Hitachi
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction
of process. The district court granted
and insufficient service
12
the motion to dismiss.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court and determined that Hitachi's single contact with New Jersey was too attenuated to support jurisdiction consistent with the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 13 The DeJames court then
considered whether Hitachi's contacts with the United States
could be aggregated to form a basis for jurisdiction. In analyzing
this "national contacts" theory,' 4 the court noted that the major
10. Hitachi, a subsidiary of Hitachi International Corporation, is a Japanese corporation with its principal place of business in Japan.
In January of 1976, Hitachi began converting the vessel at its shipyard
in Osaka, Japan, under an informal agreement with the ship's charterer. In
February 1976, a formal contract was formed for the conversion work with
the other Japanese defendants, Magnificence Carriers, Inc., Venture Shipping (Managers Ltd.) and Nippon Yisen Kaisha, the charterers of the vessel
Magnificente Venture, upon which DeJames alleges he was injured. Pursuant to this contract, Hitachi converted the vessel from a bulk carrier to a car
carrier. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1276, 1277
(D.N.J. 1980).
11. When a plaintiff alleges that the faulty design of a vessel caused his
injury, the action will lie in admiralty. Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine
Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 1977); Jig the Third Corp. v.
Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171, 175 (5th Cir. 1975);
Sieraki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98, 99 (3d Cir. 1945), affid, 328 U.S. 85
(1946). See generally McCune, MaritimeProductsLiability, 18 HASTINGS L.
J. 831 (1967). Federal courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976). Art. III, § 2 of the Constitution
provides that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
12. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1276, 1284
(D.N.J. 1980).
13. As recently construed by the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 280 (1980), fundamental fairness to the
defendant and preserving the co-equal sovereignty of the states are considered the duel precepts embodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Comment, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson: Minimum Contacts in a Modern World, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 783
(1981). See also infra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
14. The aggregation of all contacts, ties or connections a person or corporation acquires with the United States is known as the "national contacts" theory. These contacts are used as the basis for determining
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. The minimum contacts analysis
adopted by the Supreme Court in InternationalShoe is applied by analogy.
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obstacle to wide-spread support was the inability to effect valid
service of process. 15 Absent specific congressional authorization
in admiralty actions, 16 the only valid methods of service of process required the use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) or
(i) in conjunction with a state long-arm statute 17 or a "wholly
federal means" to provide authorization. 18
A "wholly federal means" is one which uses a federal law or
treaty 19 for authorization of service. The DeJames court found
This method of analysis provides a court with a manageable standard to
determine whether the defendant's contacts are such that he be required to
defend an action in the United States courts. See First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 736-39 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). First
Flight was the first case to espouse the "national contacts" theory. See infra notes 44-63 and accompanying text.
15. 654 F.2d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 1981). See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
16. Congress has provided nationwide service of process in a number of
other federal actions. If it were to authorize such service in admiralty actions, it is likely that it would conform to the existing nationwide service
statutes. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
17. Long-arm statutes are created by states to obtain jurisdiction and to
serve process on non-resident defendants. Most long-arm statutes today
are construed as reaching to the constitutional limits of due process. See
Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL.L.F. 533, 535. New Jersey's long-arm statute has been
construed to its constitutional limits. Bernardi Bros. v. Pride Mfg., Inc., 427
F.2d 297, 298 (3d Cir. 1970) (New Jersey Civil Practice Rule R, 4:4-4(c) recognizes no limitations on extraterritorial service other than that imposed by
the United States Constitution). See infra note 67-80 and accompanying
text.
18. See infra note 19.
19. A wholly federal means of service uses a federal statute or treaty in
conjunction with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (1976), which provides the constitutional methods of service of process in federal court. To utilize Rule 4, there
must be a statute authorizing service. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320
F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1963). Today, the weight of authority is that Congress has
the right to prescribe rules of judicial procedure. Bears v. Haughton, 34 U.S.
329, 360 (1835); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CrviL § 1001 (1969 & Supp. 1979). But see Mississippi Publishing Corp.
v. Murphee, 326 U.S. 438 (1945) (congressional power to prescribe rules does
not foreclose judicial consideration of the validity and meaning of those
rules).
Congress has provided specific authorization for nationwide service of
process in a number of federal actions. The underlying policy consideration
for these authorizations is uniformity within the federal law. The following
jurisdictional statutes provide for nationwide service of process: 9 U.S.C.
§ 9 (1976) (actions to confirm arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act); 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1976) (actions by the United States under the Sherman Act); 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976) (actions against a corporation under the
antitrust laws); 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976) (actions by the United States under the
Clayton Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 78aa (1976) (actions under the Securities
Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934); 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1976) (actions under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1976) (actions under the Investment Company Act of 1940); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1976)
(actions under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397,
2391 (1976) (actions under the Federal Interpleader Act); 28 U.S.C. § 2391(e)
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that no such "wholly federal means" of service was available
and determined that the state long-arm statute must be utilized.20 Consequently, Hitachi's contacts with the United States
21
could not be aggregated and utilized as a basis of jurisdiction.
The use of a state long-arm statute would restrain the federal
court as if it were a state court. 22 Thus, the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, which restrains the states, would
also govern the exercise of federal jurisdiction. The "national
contacts" theory would then be rendered ineffectual as it would
be inconsistent with fourteenth amendment due process analysis which examines only a defendant's contacts with a state.
Recent Supreme Court decisions2 3 have attempted to articulate the standards guaranteed by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 24 These include fairness to the defend(1976) (actions under Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962); 28 U.S.C. § 1655
(1976) (actions to assert rights in property when the defendant cannot be

served within the state); 28 U.S.C. § 1692 (1976) (actions concerning land
which lies in more than one district); 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1976) (service of process against a corporation in a shareholders' derivative suit); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2321 (1976) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 20, 23, 43 (1976) (actions under the interstate
commerce laws). See 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE, 4.42 at 518-23 (2d ed.
1980).

Most of these statutes provide no significant constitutional problems in
terms of personal jurisdiction since the corresponding venue provisions significantly limit where a defendant will be amenable to suit. See, e.g., 9

U.S.C. § 9 (1976) (provides for nationwide service of process in actions to
affirm arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, but limits
venue to the district where the arbitration award was made). Consequently, although a defendant may be served anywhere within the United

States, venue will be proper only in judicial districts to which the defendant
cannot object to jurisdiction on due-process grounds. Amenability to suit in
these districts will not impose any significant burden on the defendant.

20. 654 F.2d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1981).
21. Id. at 284. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment allows only contacts with the state in which the district court sits to be examined as a basis for jurisdiction.
22. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
24. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment operates as a
limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts to enter judgments affecting
rights or interests of nonresident defendants. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84, 91 (1978).
As recently construed by the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 280 (1980), fundamental fairness to the
defendant and preserving the co-equal sovereignty of the states are consid-

ered the duel precepts embodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Comment, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson: Minimum Contacts in a Modern World, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 783
(1981). The Supreme Court has determined that fundamental fairness to
the defendant is achieved by examining whether the defendant's conduct in
relation to the forum was such that he purposely availed himself of the benefits and protection of the forum's laws. This test assures a foreign defendant that he will not be inconvenienced by litigation in a forum with which
he has no connections or ties. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
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ant, by not forcing him to litigate in an inconvenient forum, and
exercise of jurisdiction which does not impinge upon a sister
state's sovereignty. 25 Abuse occurs when a state exercises jurisdiction over a defendant who has not had the requisite contacts
with the forum state. To meet these requirements, the DeJames
court concluded that the defendant must purposely avail himself of the forum, invoking its benefits and protections so that he
26
can reasonably anticipate being haled into that forum's court.
In applying this standard to the facts in DeJames, the court
of appeals held that the mooring in New Jersey of a ship refurbished by Hitachi was not that purposeful activity with the forum required to constitutionally invoke jurisdiction.2 7 The court
determined that, absent some "affiliating circumstances" 28 with
the forum, jurisdiction could not be exercised. Consequently,
the DeJames court rejected the notion that foreseeability of contact, plus contact within the forum, can be an adequate basis for
444 U.S. 280, 292 (1981); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
319 (1945). States may exercise jurisdiction only over nonresidents who
purposely avail themselves of the forum, since they would otherwise be expanding their power outside their boundaries. This exercise of power
would impinge upon rights of a sister state. Consequently, jurisdiction
would not be allowed. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see Comment, Hanson v. Denckla, 72 HARV. L. REV. 695, 706 (1958).
25. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980);
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (minimum contacts restrictions on the state courts are "a consequence of territorial limitations on the
power of the respective states").
26. 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981). See supra notes 24, 25 and accompanying
text.
27. According to the court, Hitachi neither marketed its products in, nor
derived any economic benefit from, New Jersey; therefore, the nature of
Hitachi's conduct was not such that it could have a "reasonable expecta-

tion" of being "haled before a court" in New Jersey. Id. at 284-85 (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). The
court concluded that the "fortuitous circumstance" of the vessel's presence

in New Jersey did not satisfy the requirements of foreseeability set down in
World Wide Volkswagen. 654 F.2d at 286. See also Stabilisierungsfonds Fur
Wein v. Kaiserstuhl Wine Distributors, Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981)

("stream of commerce" theory applied in trademark infringement action);
Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980) ("stream of commerce"

theory applied in products liability action). See Note, The Long-Arm Reach
of the Courts Under the Effect Test After Kulko v. Superior Court, 65 VA. L.
REV. 175 (1979), for a complete discussion of the "stream of commerce" theory. See also infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
28. The term "affiliating circumstances" originated in Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958). It, along with the phrase "purposeful availment," were given no definition, but are thought to originate in International Shoe. It is thought that this language would preclude a mechanical
method of determining jurisdiction and instead look to the quality and nature of the defendant's contacts. See generally Note, The Long-Arm Reach
of the Courts Under the Effect Test After Kulko v. Superior Court, 65 VA. L.
REV. 175 (1979).
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jurisdiction. 29 In turn, the court also rejected the contention
that the "stream of commerce" theory, 30 a basis for jurisdiction
primarily in products liability actions, might embrace those delinks in the distribution
fendants whose products are essential
31
product.
another
of
marketing
or
Foreseeability of contact with a forum is the cornerstone of
the stream of commerce theory. First articulated in Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,32 this theory
provides a basis for jurisdiction over manufacturers who, by
placing their products in the stream of commerce, and through
their commercial dealings 33 with the forum should foresee the
product entering the forum. The Supreme Court, however, limited the Gray theory in World- Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson.84
The Court required the manufacturer to purposely avail himself
of the forum, such that through this affiliation it would be fore35
Utiliseeable that he may be held accountable in that forum.
29. 654 F.2d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 1981). See infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
30. Id. at 285. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137,
1142-43 (7th Cir. 1975) (when a manufacturer of a product sells it to another
or places it in some form of marketing scheme, the product has entered a
"stream of commerce"). See also infra note 32 and accompanying text.
31. Normally, decisions utilizing the "stream of commerce" theory have
involved injurious products sold from a manufacturer to another customer
and so on until they reached the hands of the ultimate consumer. The manufacturer becomes liable when he could foresee the product entering the
forum through his efforts to market his product. In DeJames, however, the
product which caused the harm was an instrumentality of another product's
distribution. The DeJames decision held that a manufacturer must purposely use the market in which his product did harm or there cannot be
jurisdiction.
32. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). This concept was specifically reaffirmed in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
Gray involved a valve manufacturer who sold his valves to another manufacturer for inclusion in water heaters. The water heaters then reached various states through a distribution chain. When one of the heaters exploded
in Illinois, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction over the out-ofstate valve manufacturer. The court explained that by selling its valves for
use as a component the manufacturer had purposefully placed its products
into the stream of commerce. World- Wide Volkswagen's reference to Gray
is unclear. The Supreme Court explained the basic stream of commerce
theory and then suggested a comparison to Gray. It may be that the Court
was intimating that Gray had gone too far in finding the manufacturer of a
component part, as opposed to the end product, amenable to jurisdiction. If
this interpretation is correct, then DeJames was correctly decided. Justice
Gibbons, in his dissent in DeJames, read the reference to Gray as an approving one. He would have upheld jurisdiction over Hitachi on the theory
that the car-carrying ship was an integral component in the distribution
scheme. 654 F.2d 280, 293.
33. While accepting "affiliating circumstances", the DeJames court severely limited the scope of these "circumstances."
34. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
35. Id. at 295. If the defendant does not voluntarily avail himself of the
forum, then the assertion of jurisdiction would infringe upon the sover-
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zation of a direct or indirect marketing or distribution chain to
derive a substantial benefit from the forum would fulfill the affil36
iation requirement.
The DeJames court determined, however, that the standards
articulated in World- Wide Volkswagen would also be applicable
where the defendant's relation to the forum resulted from the
distribution of another product.3 7 In its analysis, the court took
a restrictive view as to what satisfies the requirements of purposeful affiliating circumstances. The court felt that to have purposeful affiliating circumstances, the use of some type of
marketing scheme to derive benefit from the forum was necessary.3 8 This conclusion views Hitachi's status, as an integral link
in the distribution of Japanese cars, irrelevant, absent more
schematic purposeful affiliations with the forum. The court
went on to find that Hitachi's contact with New Jersey through
the American market for Japanese cars was inadequate to provide the requisite affiliation with the forum.39
Thus, the
DeJames court limited the scope of purposeful affiliation to situations where the defendant utilizes a direct or indirect marketing or distribution plan calculated to derive a substantial
benefit 4 0 from the forum.
In light of other interpretations of the "stream of commerce"
theory, 41 the DeJames court has made it apparent that the Third
Circuit is unwilling to expand the scope of foreseeability in
products liability actions. But, the Third Circuit has also indieignty of a sister state. Thus, no matter how convenient or efficient the forum might be, these interests will be looked at only if the forum state has
not exceeded its sovereign authority. Cf. Bean v. Winding River Camp
Ground, 444 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (fairness to the defendant considered over the sovereignty issue).
36. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
37. See supra note 31.
38. 654 F.2d 280, 285. The court determined that unless the manufacturer attempted to utilize some marketing or distribution scheme in the forum state, there would be an absence of the requisite purposeful affiliation.
39. Id. The court believed that the opposite decision would permit the
products to become in effect an agent for service of process wherever the
product was distributed. This conclusion appears to be somewhat extreme
given the nature and characteristics of admiralty and raises at least two
questions. Does this give ship manufacturers one "free ride" in a port of
each state? When will a shipbuilder have the requisite affiliation with the
forum? See also World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).

40. 654 F.2d 280, 285.
41. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The
Supreme Court allowed further jurisdictional expansion in holding that a
single act within the state would be sufficient for jurisdiction if the cause of
action arose out of that contact. See Note The Role of Foreseeabilityin JurisdictionalInquiry: Tyson v. Whitaker & Sons, Inc., 32 ME L. REV. 496, 512,
n.72 (1979-80) (when a defective product causes injury in the forum, that is
the contact); Comment, The Minimum Contacts Standard and Alien De-
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cated that the due-process requirements of World-Wide Volkswagen will include defendants whose products form the chain
of distribution for another product. 42 Although the court followed the language and spirit of World-Wide Volkswagen, it
frustrated a jurisdictional basis that has grown along with the
expanding area of products liability.
After finding that jurisdiction could not be exercised under
the stream of commerce theory consistent with the fourteenth
amendment, the DeJames court then considered whether
Hitachi's national contacts 43 with the United States could be aggregated to form a basis for jurisdiction compatible with the due
44
process clause of the fifth amendment.
At the outset of the decision, the court acknowledged that
the fifth amendment due process clause determines the constitutionality of jurisdiction in a federal cause of action such as admiralty.4 5 While the court expressed uncertainty as to whether
Third Circuit precedent allowed the examination of a defendant's "national contacts, '46 it assumed for purposes of appeal
that if service of process could be accomplished constitutionally,
47
then jurisdiction would be proper.
The due process clause of the fifth amendment restrains the
federal government from arbitrarily depriving any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. 48 The courts, in
fendants, 12 LAw & POL'Y OF INT'L Bus. 783, 792-803 (1980-81) (discusses variations of the "stream of commerce" theory).
The single act has been held sufficient to allow jurisdiction most often
when the act was subject to special state regulation. See, e.g., McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Traveler's Health Ass'n v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (both cases dealt with insurance contracts
within the state). Jurisdiction based on a tortious act causing a single injury in the forum has faced more opposition. See Comment, Tortious Act as
a Basisfor Jurisdiction in Products Liability Cases, 33 FORDHAM L. REV.
671, 682-85 (1965).
42. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 14.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also infra note 49 and accompanying

text.
45. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 283 (3d Cir.
1981) ("Because this suit arises under the district court's admiralty jurisdiction, the due process clause of the fifth amendment determines whether the
district court has personal jurisdiction over Hitachi."). See also supra note
11. See generally, Comment, Fifth Amendment Due Process Limitations on
Nationwide FederalJurisdiction,61 B.U.L. REV. 403 (1981) (although there
are probably no other constitutional requirements, the principles that have
evolved concerning fundamental fairness to the defendant should be incorporated into the analysis).
46. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 283 (3d Cir.
1981) (Third Circuit precedent did not expressly approve of the "national
contacts" theory).
47. Id.
48. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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articulating this mandate and its application to the jurisdiction
of the federal courts, have determined that a "general fairness
standard" 49 dictates whether the exercise of jurisdiction is constitutional. A number of courts have defined this standard to be
analogous to the "minimum contacts" analysis announced by
50
the Supreme Court in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.
This approach requires a state court to examine a defendant's
contacts or ties with the state as the basis for jurisdiction.
52
These "contacts"5 1 must be of a sufficient quality and nature
so that the exercise of jurisdiction will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 53 This analysis of federal minimum contacts, combined with the principles and rules
of the federal venue statute5 4 and forum non conveniens,55 has
received support from a number of other circuits. 5 6 This analysis, however, has been criticized as not limiting federal jurisdic49. See, e.g., Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle, A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414, 417

(E.D. Pa. 1979) (the fifth amendment due process standard is considered to
afford a defendant general fairness). This is achieved by analogizing the
minimum contacts analysis presented in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), to a defendant's contacts with the United States.
See also Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 212 F.2d 147,
154 (5th Cir. 1954) (jurisdiction in federal question cases tested by "basic
principles of fairness"). See generally Comment, The Minimum Contacts
Standard and Alien Defendants, 12 LAW AND POL'Y OF. INT'L Bus. 783 (198081).
50. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In InternationalShoe, the Supreme Court held
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required only that
the defendant have certain minimum contacts with the state so that the
"maintenance of the suit [would not offend] traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice. Id. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457
(1952)).
Further, the court required that due process analysis be based, not
upon quantity of contacts, but upon the "quality and nature" of the defendant's activity in connection with the state. Id. at 319. Compare Note, The
Growth of the International Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. CHi. L. REV.523 (1948-49)
with Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (the court's analysis should deal
with the relationship between the forum, the defendant and the litigation).
51. See supra notes 28 and 36 and accompanying text.
52. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
53. Id. at 325.
54. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1404, 1406 dealing with venue, transfer of venue and
forum non conveniens. These principles, through their interaction with the
federal courts, attempt to bring the situs of trial to the most convenient federal forum.
55. The general federal venue statute, supra note 54, would mitigate
some of the application problems of the "national contacts" approach.
Aliens may be sued in any district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1976), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406 (1976).
56. See, e.g., Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974) (only
minimum contacts with the United States are necessary to exercise jurisdiction; venue provisions will allow for a convenient forum).
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tion in any meaningful manner.5 7 For example, the district court
in Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp.58 articulated a
five-part fairness test in which no one element dominates the
analysis. 5 9 Although not widely accepted, the Oxord test
presents a comprehensive analysis which places fundtion above
mechanical methodology in determining federal jurisdiction in a
federal matter.
Regardless of the methodology used, the "national contacts"
theory is founded on the notion that the United States, as sovereign, has the power to exercise jurisdiction over any individual,
corporation, or property which is found within its territory or
which is determined to have enough contact with the territory
so that the exercise of jurisdiction will not offend notions of fair
play. 60 Thus, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant based on his national contacts. 61 The due pro57. For example, a boat maker in Maine who only sells boats in Maine,
to Maine residents, could theoretically be haled into a California federal
court if one of his boats caused injury in California.
58. 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
59. See Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191,
203 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (adopting "fairness test" rather than a simple or
mechanical "national contacts" approach). The Oxford First court set out
five factors in its test to determine jurisdiction in federal question cases:
"[1] the extent of the defendant's contact with the place where the action
was brought; i.e., the International Shoe type criteria. . ., [2] inconvenience to the defendant of having to defend in a jurisdiction other than that
of his residence or place of business, . . . [31 judicial economy, [i.e., the
possibility of multiple lawsuits] . .. , [4] probable situs of the discovery
proceedings. . ., and [5] the nature of the regulated activity in question
and the extent of impact that defendant's activities have beyond the borders of his state of residence or business." Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 203-04 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
60. See, e.g., McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917) ("the foundation of
jurisdiction is physical power"). Accord Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723
(1877) (every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction over all persons and
property within its territory).
Originally, under the doctrine stated in Pennoyer v. Neff, a defendant
had to be physically present within the forum for jurisdiction to be proper.
With the dramatic increase in the mobility of society and the growth and
importance of corporations, Pennoyer's physical presence concepts became
outmoded. Accordingly, the Supreme Court adopted the minimum contacts
test in InternationalShoe to determine whether a defendant was amenable
to suit.
Since the InternationalShoe decision, the Court, acknowledging modern commercial realities, has attempted to direct the parameters of due process analysis to provide fairness to the defendant and substantial justice.
See, e.g., supra notes 10 and 32. See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court,
the Due Process Clause, and the In Personam Jurisdictionof State Courts,
25 U. Cm. L. REV. 569 (1958).
61. See, e.g., Engineering Equip. Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying "national contacts" approach in admiralty action); Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp.
659 (D.N.H. 1977) (applying "national contacts" approach in case arising
under Clayton Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22, 26 (1976)); Cryomedics, Inc. v.
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cess analysis, however, doesn't end here.
In order for jurisdiction to comport with due process, the
federal court must be competent to adjudicate the matter. This
competence is acquired when venue is proper and when the defendant has received reasonable notice through appropriate
service of process. 6 2 It is this aspect of the due process analysis
that caused the DeJames court to reject the "national contacts"
63
theory.
The court acknowledged the theory's logical appeal, 64 but
noted that the major obstacle to wide-spread support is the inability to affect constitutional service of process. 65 The DeJames
court determined that, absent specific congressional authorization 66 for nationwide service of process in admiralty actions, the
breadth of federal process would be limited to Rule 4(e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 67 Rule 4(e) provides for service upon parties not found within the state in which the district
court sits. 68 It allows authorization for such service through the
use of a federal statute, treaty or court order (wholly federal
Spembly, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975) (applying "national contacts" approach in case arising under federal patent laws, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271,
281, 293 (1970)); Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich.
1973) (aggregating national contacts in case arising under the Death on
High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970)); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F.
Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (applying "national contacts" approach in case aris-

ing under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1979)); Edward
J. Moriarity & Co. v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.
Ohio 1967) (applying "national contacts" approach in antitrust action); First
Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962)
(applying "national contacts" approach in case arising under Interstate

Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20 (1958)). See generally Green, supra note 3;
Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HAxv. L. REV. 1121, 1123-25 n.6 (1966) (suggesting that federal courts
look to national contacts of defendant to determine jurisdiction in federal
question cases). Comment, Fifth Amendment Due Process Limitations on
Nationwide FederalJurisdiction,61 B.U.L. REV. 403 (1981) (although there

are probably no other constitutional requirements, the principles that have
evolved concerning fundamental fairness to the defendant should be incorporated into the analysis).
62. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950). See generally Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal
Courts-Suggestionsfor Reform, 7 VAND. L. REV. 608 (1954). Service in the

federal courts is regulated by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP).
63. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 283, 286-90 (3d
Cir. 1981).
64. Id. at 283.
65. Service must be made to reasonably notify the defendant of the suit

against him. See supra note 62.
66. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
67. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(e) (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Rule 4(e)].
68. Id.
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means)6 9 or, in the absence of such authorization, through the
use of a state long-arm statute.70 The court determined that the
federal treaty which DeJames attempted to utilize was a multilateral treaty7 l providing the mechanics for service of judicial
and extra-judicial documents abroad, and was not intended to
create authorization for such service itself. Consequently, the
DeJames court limited itself to using the New Jersey state long72
arm statute for authorization of service.
Traditionally, the federal courts, when utilizing a state's
long-arm statute, have restrained themselves as if they were the
state courts exercising jurisdiction. 73 Consequently, not only
the state mechanics of process, but also the state due process
limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction, are adopted by the
69. 654 F.2d at 284. Congress has authorized nationwide service of process in some cases. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) (nationwide service of
process for violations of Securities Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 5, 25 (1976)
(nationwide service of process to bring in additional parties in actions by
United States to enforce antitrust laws); 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1976) (nationwide
service of process in interpleader actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1976) (nationwide service of process in stockholder's derivative action).
The DeJames court also stated that since the treaty could be utilized in
conjunction with a state long-arm statute, the treaty was not an independent authorization of service of process. 654 F.2d at 288. See Shoei Kako Co.
v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973) (state long-arm
may be used in conjunction with treaty as long as the foreign nation in
which service is made does not object).
70. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
71. On appeal, DeJames contended that the Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extra-judicial Documents in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 361 provided a wholly federal means of service of
process, thus allowing for the aggregation of Hitachi's contacts with the
United States as a whole. The court rejected this contention, holding that
the treaty, rather than creating independent authorization of service of process, provided an efficient method by which service of process could be
made in a foreign country "where a federal or state statute authorized such
service." 654 F.2d at 290. The court based its conclusion on a review of the
legislative history of the treaty. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 11-12 (1967); S. REP. No. 2392, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-19 (1958), reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD.NEWS 5201, 5206.
72. DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d Cir.
1981). Utilization of state procedures through Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure limits the reach of the federal court to the extent allowed
by the state procedure. Hartley v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines,
379 F.2d 354, 357 (3d Cir. 1967).
73. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406,
418 (9th Cir. 1977) (in federal question case Rule 4(e) requires that, where
service of process is made under state statute or rule, the jurisdiction of the
federal court is limited by state law). Accord Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg.
Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 449 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir. 1971) (application of Colorado
long-arm statute pursuant to Rule 4(e)); Gavelek v. Coscol Petroleum
Corp., 491 F. Supp. 188, 192 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (application of Michigan longarm statute); Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle, A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414, 418 (E.D.
Pa. 1979) (rejecting "national contacts" approach because Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not provide basis for application); Volk Corp. v. Art-Pak
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federal courts. Thus, a federal court, even when hearing an admiralty matter (as in DeJames), is restrained from exercising

jurisdiction over a defendant
by the due process clause of the
74

fourteenth amendment.
Rule 4(e) specifically provides for authorization through a
state long-arm statute under the "circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule. ' 75 The vast majority of federal courts have interpreted this to mean that they can only
76
utilize a state long-arm statute as if they were a state court.
The motivation for such an interpretation is elusive, as there is
very little analysis of the source of this restriction, but the restriction may be either voluntary or guided by some constitutional or congressional policy.7 7 In any event, this restriction
tends to nullify the "national contacts" theory. This results because the fourteenth amendment due-process clause requires
that only a defendant's contacts with the state be considered the
basis for jurisdiction. Any other result would offend the federalism values instilled in the fourteenth amendment due-process
analysis. 78 As a result of this analysis, the DeJames court conClip Art Serv., 432 F. Supp. 1179, 1180-81 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (application of
New York long-arm statute).
Prior to the 1963 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
there was no provision for federal courts to utilize state long-arm statutes
developed in the wake of InternationalShoe. The federal courts turned to
Rule 4(d) (7), which authorizes the use of state service of process methods
in federal actions to serve corporations within the state or authorized to do
business within the state, to exercise jurisdiction through state long-arm
provisions. See Star v. Rogalny, 162 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. 111.1957); Notes of
Advisory Committee on 1963 Amendments to Rules, Note on Subdivision
(d) (7), FED. R. Crv. P. 4.
Courts resorting to Rule 4(d) (7) in federal question cases have reached
the same result as those courts employing state long-arm statutes through
Rule 4(e) on the issue of amenability to suit. See, e.g., Hartley v. Sioux City
& New Orleans Barge Lines, 379 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1967) (application of
Pennsylvania substituted service statute, pursuant to Rule 4(d) (7), brought
the jurisdictional inquiry within the limitations of that statute); Amburn v.
Harold Forster Indus., 423 F. Supp. 1302, 1302-05 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (rejecting
"national contacts" approach where service of process made by state longarm statute pursuant to Rule 4(d) (7)). See also C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1068, 1069 (1969 & Supp. 1979).
74. The mechanics of process are the actual requirements of service and
the method prescribed for the physical act.
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (1976).
76. See supra note 73.
77. This voluntary restriction is not constitutionally mandated but is
merely a result of Congress' desire to place the district courts in a logical,
convenient location. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.10 at
620 (2d ed. 1977).
78. See Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976) (values of federalism are instilled in the due-process analysis). See also WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1980); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Comment, Hanson v. Denckla, 72 HARv. L. REV.
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cluded that the "national contacts" theory could not be used as a
basis for jurisdiction absent specific congressional, or a "wholly
federal'" means of service of process.

79

Any other outcome, the

court stated, would result in a judicially created authorization
for service of process which the court concluded was beyond its
province.8 0
The DeJames court's analysis of the obstacle to "national
contacts" serves again to call attention to the undesirable anomaly which exists when a federal court, hearing a federal question
matter such as admiralty, must labor under the fourteenth
amendment due-process restrictions imposed on the states
rather than under the fifth amendment limitations on federal
due process. As the DeJames court pointed out,81 this situation
could easily be rectified by congressional authorization of service of process in admiralty actions, and even more broadly, in all
federal question cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.82 Until such time,
however, the deleterious effects 8 3 of this anomalous situation

695, 706 (1958). States may exercise jurisdiction over non-residents who
purposely avail themselves of the forum, otherwise they would be expanding their power outside their boundaries. This exercise of power
would impinge upon a sister state's rights. Consequently, jurisdiction
would not be allowed. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253.
79. Absent specific statutory authorization or a wholly federal means of
service, the breadth of the federal court's jurisdiction is controlled by Rule
4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
599 F.2d 151,156 n.3 (7th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 451 U.S. 982 (1981). Rule 4(e)
provides:
Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district
court is held provides (1) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of
an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found
within the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to him to appear and
respond or defend in an action by reason of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his property located within the state, service
may in either case be made under the circumstances and in the manner
prescribed in that statute or rule.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Thus, the federal courts have applied the state longarm statutes of the state in which the district court sits. In employing state
long-arm statutes, the federal courts have voluntarily limited their assertion
of jurisdiction by the fourteenth amendment as if they were state courts.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 156 n.3 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 982 (1981); Ag-Tronic v. Frank Paviour, Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393, 400 (D.
Neb. 1976). But see Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd, 397 F. Supp. 287, 290
(D. Conn. 1975); Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F.
Supp. 722, 728 (D. Utah 1973) (both courts applied the minimum contacts
test to the United States and used Rule 4(e) in conjunction with the state
long-arm statute).
80. 654 F.2d 280, 284.
81. Id.
82. Congress is more likely to take limited steps with its blank check to
authorize service of process. See supra notes 19 and 77 and accompanying
text.
83. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. The inferior federal courts
were to hear matters of national concern, and to afford citizens a national
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will continue to hamper the federal courts, especially in light of
the increased mobility of society and the expanding character of
the commercial world.
The effect is threefold. First, the federal courts, in applying
the long-arm statutes of the states in which they sit, are more
likely to produce non-uniform application of federal law, which
is intended to be national in scope. 84 This results because each
state, in enacting its long-arm statute, may not provide a comprehensive scheme of attaining jurisdiction, 85 or perhaps may
not stretch its statute to its constitutional limits. 8

6

Second, the

national character and traditional independence of the federal
courts as a forum above local prejudice is thwarted by treating
the federal courts as if they were state courts.8 7 Finally, this
anomalous situation allows a defendant, who has substantial
"6national contacts," to commit torts or contract breaches which
have remedies under federal law and then to escape federal jurisdiction because he does not have sufficient contact with the
state in which the cause of action occurred. There does not appear to be a practical or principled reason for this restriction on
federal jurisdiction, especially in matters within the federal
courts' original jurisdiction.
The DeJames decision illustrates a conservative approach to
the parameters of personal jurisdiction. The court, in analyzing
the "stream of commerce" theory, emphasized the role of soverforum where a uniform body of federal law was applied. See F. JAMES &G.
620 (2d ed. 1977); C. WRIGHT, HAND§ 64 at 304-05 (3d ed. 1976). See generally Green, Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due
Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967 (1961).

HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.10 at
BOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS

84. State long-arm statutes are particularly suited to address state concerns in areas such as tort and contract law and in the regulation of business within the state, but they bear little relation to federal needs which are
national in scope. In areas such as taxation, patent and trademark law, admiralty, antitrust, and interstate commerce, the federal courts should be
able to proceed where a state court would refuse because the defendant
does not have sufficient contacts. It is vital in these areas of national importance that uniformity of decisions prevail.
85. A state long-arm statute can be utilized only when the particular
cause of action is enumerated in the long-arm statute. Gray v. American
Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
86. Although New Jersey's long-arm statute has been construed to its
constitutional limit, W.A. Kraft Corp. v. Terrace on the Park, Inc., 337 F.
Supp. 206, 207 (D.N.J. 1972); Bernardi Bros., v. Pride Mfg., Inc., 427 F.2d 297,
303 (3d Cir. 1970), the states are not required to exercise their power to its
constitutional limits. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S.
437 (1952).
87. This voluntary restraint operates to restrict the federal courts in
promulgating national law. Limiting the federal courts' jurisdiction to that
of a state court completely frustrates the purpose of having an independent
federal judiciary to determine federal law.
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eignty 88 over the factual considerations involved in admiralty
suits. The court's decision is especially significant because it
drastically narrowed what is considered "purposeful availment"
in products liability cases. In rejecting the "national contacts"
theory, the court again followed the traditional interpretations
of the law. However, in light of the judicial policy regarding the
rules of civil procedure, the court's decision is appropriate. The
court points out, for instance, the need for nationwide service of
process, at least in admiralty actions. While the DeJames decision is supported by case law, the court's generally conservative
attitude may be questioned, for if it continues to prevail, our jurisdictional principles are in danger of becoming outmoded.89
PatrickLoftus

88. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
89. 654 F.2d 280 at 309 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (possibly our notions of
jurisdiction are already outmoded).

